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§5.I. Introduction. Despite the considerable attention that has 
been focused on the special legal problems of people living below the 
poverty line and on the general inadequacy of legal services provided 
to them, there have been relatively few developments in Massachusetts 
law during the past SURVEY year specifically addressed to this issue. 
This is, perhaps, not surprising, since despite increasing interest, very 
few poor people come into the appellate courts except as criminal de-
fendants; indeed, very few come into the courts at all to seek vindi-
cation of legally protected rights. There are also very limited organized 
constituencies to seek new legislation on their behalf. If the following 
account, therefore, suggests no particular trend either in the judiciary 
or in the legislature in this area, it is simply because there is none. 
It remains to be seen whether the increasing activity in providing 
advocates for the poor, as reported in Section C below, will change 
this situation. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§5.2. Housing. Many judicial decisions involving disputes be-
tween amuent litigants may affect the poor in some way; therefore, 
any discussion limited to "poverty law" must focus on the few cases 
having a direct bearing on the legal relationships of the economically 
disadvantaged, regardless of whether the litigant immediately involved 
could be classified as "poor." 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Stapleton v. Cohen 1 did 
little to achieve the goal of providing greater incentives for adequate 
maintenance of slum housing. In the Stapleton case the plaintiff 
slipped and fell in a dimly lit common hallway. Evidence was .intro-
duced sh0wing that the common passageway had less light than was 
requireq.by the Sanitary Code of the Department of Health.2 In deny-
ing recovery, the Court refused to admit the violation of the Sanitary 
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§5.2. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1171, 228 N.E.2d 64, also noted in §3.3 supra. 
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Code as evidence of negligence. It relied on the long-standing rule that 
the property owner has a duty only to use reasonable care to keep the 
property in the same condition it was in, or appeared to be in, at the 
time of the creation of the tenancy.s In effect, the Court removed a 
substantial incentive for compliance with applicable building codes. 
A contrary decision, would, however, place heavy burdens on land-
owners unable to finance appropriate alterations. Nonetheless, the 
rule as set forth in Stapleton renders the slum-dwellers' existence not 
only more uncomfortable but also more hazardous. 
It appears that the more affluent vacationer will be better protected. 
In Horton v. Marston4 the plaintiff leased a summer cottage from Sep-
tember, 1962 through May, 1963. On May 8, 1963, she was injured 
when a gas stove on the leased premises exploded. The Court ruled 
that the defendant landowner could be held liable for a breach of 
an implied warranty to provide inhabitable premises, and that the 
warranty applied to defects that do not render the premises, as a whole, 
uninhabitable.5 The Court did not deem the nine-month period so long 
as to place the risk of concealed defects on the tenant. In reaching its 
decision, the Court quoted approvingly authority that "an important 
part of what the hirer ... [paid for was] the opportunity to enjoy 
... [the dwelling] without delay, and without the expense of pre-
paring for its use."6 It remains to be seen whether the Court will 
extend this doctrine to include those tenants in substandard housing 
who attempt to recover for injuries sustained by hidden defects when 
toilets, stoves, and heating systems break down. 
§5.3. Welfare. In City of Brockton v. Massachusetts Department 
of Public Welfare,1 an applicant was denied hospital benefits under 
General Laws, Chapter 1I8A, Sections 13 through 32 by the local 
welfare board. The applicant appealed and the State Department of 
Public Welfare reversed the local board. The City of Brockton, acting 
through the local board, appealed the department's ruling. The local 
board contended that the applicant did not qualify because he had 
made a transfer of assets for less than adequate consideration more 
than one year, but within five years, of the date of application.2 The 
Superior Court agreed with the local board. The Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed the lower court and affirmed the ruling of the depart-
ment. 
The Court reasoned that the provisions for old age assistance3 dif-
fered in many respects from the provisions for medical assistance to 
the aged.4 One of the major differences, the Court noted, concerns the 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1173, 228 N.E.2d at 66. 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 591, 225 N.E.2d 311, also noted in §I.4 supra. 
5Id. at 594, 225 N.E.2d at 313. 
6 Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). 
§5.3. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 505, 224 N.E.2d 498. 
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time allowed in which to make transfers for inadequate consideration 
without being denied assistance. The Court also found that under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,1i the rulings of the department as to 
matters of fact are final, but that Section 21 of the Medical Assistance 
for the Aged Act does not deny judicial review on matters of law. 
Although this decision, by allowing the city to appeal rulings of the 
department, reduces the ability of the state to establish tight, uniform 
controls over welfare, it is not unfair in light of the clear language 
of the Administrative Procedure Act and the contributions made by 
the municipalities to support this welfare burden. Recent legislation, 
however, has abolished local welfare boards and shifted the financial 
burden of welfare to the Commonwealth.6 
One could read the Court's opinion as a recognition, sub silentio, 
of the harshness of disqualifying a beneficiary from receiving necessary 
expenses generated by factors beyond his control. Realistically, one 
should recognize the hospital'S participation as a party; the decision 
funnels more state revenues to the hospitals, thereby reducing the cost 
of hospital care rendered to paying patients. 
Old-age assistance does not represent a gift to the recipient since a 
lien attaches to the recipient's property. The statute, however, does 
not set forth a time period within which a bill must be brought to 
establish the lien. In City of Medford v. Quinn,7 the Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the trial judge's determination that the "lien must be 
enforced within a 'reasonable time' or the right is lost."8 The Court 
concluded that "the right to enforce a lien ... [is] limited only by a 
showing of undue hardship .... "9 Since the Court construed the 
legislative purpose of old-age assistance to be to offer relief from suffer-
ing, rather than to confer a benefit on the recipient'S heirs, the Court 
strained to uphold the enforceability of the lien even though it admit-
ted that the defendants were "inconvenienced." 
§5.4. Domestic relations. With welfare workers regularly encour-
aging deserted mothers to pursue fathers of their illegitimate offspring, 
lawyers should recognize the potentially increased utilization of the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.1 The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in M_ v. W _2 allowed enforcement of a support order 
under the Act where a child was conceived in New York, and the father 
resided in Massachusetts. 
Although criminal non-support proceedings, commenced in a district 
court, may be tried de novo in the Superior Court, enforcement under 
the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act does not provide such a 
I; Id., c. 30A, §14. 
6 See §5.8 infra. 
71967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 271, 223 N.E.2d 698. 
8Id. at 274, 223 N.E.2d at 701. 
9Id. 
§5.4. 1 G.L., c. 27M. 
21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 227 N.E.2d 469, also noted in §4.1 supra. 
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'right. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, did not feel this diff!:!!-
ence pr«ecluded the district. cotutsfrom acting, to "en£orce the . support 
order. The Court noted, however, that the proceedings under the act 
may not be. appropriate when the issue of paternity is disputed; since 
the petitioner may never have appeared in the court of theresp@nding 
state.3 In the instant case, the father admitted paternity., 
Since the Court conceded that the act is a' ;Criminal statute,a re-
spondentpresumably possesses the right to refuse· to;,ctestify in a pro-
ceeding under the act.4 The' Court left open, however, the question 
. whether such a refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds suffi-
ciently establishes a. disputed issue of paternity, :rendering inappr,q-
priate this method of enforcement under the act. Allowing a 
respondent to escape liability by his mere refusal to testify in the 
responding state renders the act ineffective in many situations, while 
basing liability upon the unchallenged testiIllony of a distant mother 
raises problems of fairness. Furthermore, requiring the respondent to 
testify to avoid liability may infringe substantially on his Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
§5.5. Right to counsel. Applying the principles of Inre Gault,! 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Marsden v. Commonwifalth2 held 
that the right to . counsel exists in juvenile proceedings, Instre~s­
ing the limited scope of its holding, the Court said that the juvenile, 
in not asking for counsel; "did not waivecounsel."3 Presumably, a 
juvenile would 110t be able, in any event, to waive this tight. Gault 
and Marsden extend .the Sixth' Amendment right of counsel to cases 
'oot denominated as "criminal" and stress .that failure to have couns!;!l 
may lead the child to forego rights such as the lodging of an appeal 
from an adverse determination. Perhaps the Court may, in civil cases, 
extend similar rights to welfare recipients and other indigents who 
often need counsel to.assert theirdaims. 
§5.61 Search and seizure. In Commonwealth v. Hadley,l the Su-
preme Judicial Court held! the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
inapplicable to .routine inspections by health inspectors. The Unite.d 
States Supreme Court's subsequent decision to the contrary2 opens the 
way for· further challenges to the activities of governmental officials. 
In so far as procedural safeguards :are oecessary to' ensure protection 
3Id. at 1044, 227 N.E.2d at 474. . 
4 It must be granted that the defeI).dant .canavoid, the criminal liability under 
this section by the mere expedient of satisfying the support obligation: Nonetheless, 
the privilege should exist in most cases since 'G.L., c.273, §H, makes it a crinieto 
beget an illegitimate child in Massachusetts. 
§5.5. 1387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 887, 227 N.E.2d T, also nbtedin §9.14. infra. 
3Id. at 890, 227 N.E.2d at 3. 
§5.6. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1359,222 N.E.2d 681. 
2 Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 
523 (1967). 
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against unjust substantive Jaws, one wouldwe1come prohibitions on 
the midnight raids by welfare investigat0rs seeking to find a male 
inhabitant of households receiving aid for dependent children. 
,i§5.7. Race. In upholding the state's Racial Imbalance Law,l the 
Supreme Judicial Court utilized broad language that might insulate 
other compensatory programs from Fourteenth· Amendment attacks: 
It would be the height of irony if the racial imbalance act, 
enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of 'achieving equal 
educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil 
. a:.Dcicatioris based on race, flounder on unsuspected shoals of the 
Fc:mlteenih Amendm~nt. 2 
. The Court reasoned that "the heart of the matter is whether the 
meahs are reasonably related to the objective ... "3 and "until a pupil 
has been iniact excluded from a public school on account of race, 
weare unimpressed' with the argument that the act works a denial 
of equal protection."4 Unless the Court is willing to say that every 
job, housing and educational preference granted to a black person 
by necessity excludes a white person on the grounds of race, then the 
Court leaves room for legislative and administrative experimentation 
with compensatory programs that are specifically designed to aid black 
citizens. 
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
. §~.8. Welfare. Rising welfare rolls compared with rising overall 
prosperity have proved one of the major paradoxes of the past decade. 
Finding a solution to the welfare problem may prove to be one of the 
major domestic preoccupations in the coming decade. During the 1967 
SURVEY year, the General Court moved to deal with the problem in a 
way that may make substantive changes more likely, by reorganizing 
the administrative and fiscal structure of welfare and by placing the 
system solely within the control of the state.1 The act, to take effect 
on July I, 1968, makes no substantive changes in the present law or 
eligibility standards. At the present time, no provision has been made 
for the funding of the program, which will be achieved through the 
state's general fund, It is estimated that cost will be $65 million in 
the first year.2 
Under the new act, the state Department of Welfare will be under 
the direct supervision and control Qf.a Commissioner of Public Wel-
§5.7. 1 Acts of 1965, c. 641. 
2 School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, 1967 .Mass.Adv. Sh. 1027, 
1031, 227 N.E.2d 729, 733, also noted in §§8.6-8.9infra. 
3Id. 
'. 4'Id. at 1033, 227 N.E.2d at 734. 
§5.8. 1 Acts of 1967, c. 658. 
2 Boston Globe, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 10, col. 2. 
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fare, appointed by the Governor for a term of office coterminous with 
his own.s The commissioner must have a master's degree in social 
work and at least ten years of social work experience. He will have 
the power to appoint and dismiss all employees in the department4 
and to make all necessary rules and regulations. 
In place of the presently existing two hundred and seventy local 
district offices, public welfare services will be directly provided by 
approximately fifty "community service centers"5 supervised by suit-
ably located regional offices. These centers will be under the control 
of professionally qualified center directors, appointed by the commis-
sioner. The concept of these "multi-service" centers, which will 
provide their clients with comprehensive services and referrals to 
appropriate agencies, was suggested by a recent report sponsored by 
the co-sponsors of the bill, the Massachusetts Commission on Children 
and Youth, and the United Community Services of Greater Boston.6 
In addition to the function of the present district offices in providing 
categorical assistance and general relief after the determination of the 
client's eligibility, the new community service centers will directly 
dispense services as disparate as "casework or counseling," "protective 
services for children, unmarried mothers, and the aging and other 
adults," "legal services related to social problems," "foster family 
care," "adoption and homemaker and day care services," "informal 
education and group activities," and "training in responsible parent-
hood and home management."7 The new act thus commits Massa-
chusetts welfare administration to the existing social work philosophy 
advocating service and rehabilitation. This is contrary to the view 
of those who maintain that such comprehensive servicing interferes 
unreasonably with the client's freedom and that much of the resources 
devoted to the identification and provision of the various services 
could be put to the alternative use of providing the poor what they 
most need, namely, money. 
To offset the centralization of the welfare administration at a time 
when decentralization is being urged as a cure for the alienation and 
lack of involvement of the poor, Section 7 of the act established a 
"community center board" at each community service center, consist-
ing of fifteen to thirty members, initially constituted by one nominee 
from the city councils of each town in the area, with any remaining 
nominations being made by the commissioner. Thereafter, new ap-
pointments will be made by the commissioner from a list of nomina-
tions prepared by the board. Although the object of the board is 
stated to be "to assure effective citizen participation in the work of the 
S Acts of 1967, c. 658, §3. 
4 Id. §9 subject to exceptions therein. 
5 Id. §84 establishes the criteria to be used in determining the location of these 
centers. 
6 See National Study Service, Meeting the Problems of People in Massachusetts 
(1965). 
7 Acts of 1967, c. 658, §2. 
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community service centers,"S its role is purely advisory to the center 
and the commissioner.D A "fraudulent claims board"10 and a "state 
advisory board"u complete the new administrative structure. 
The main goal of the new act is to ensure uniform and equitable 
administration of the welfare laws throughout all municipalities in 
the Commonwealth. Although welfare recipients in small and rela-
tively wealthy towns might tend to lose by the equalization process, 
the new system will probably eliminate waste. This will be particularly 
so in towns with no welfare case load or applications, which were 
formerly required to maintain funds and trained personnel for the 
contingency of a welfare application.12 Further, the new legislation 
may serve to raise the grants of recipients in the larger urban areas 
such as Boston. All this depends upon the success of the General Court 
in obtaining the necessary funds. 
Ultimately, however, the new act pins its hopes on the new com-
munity service centers, where "a spectrum of social and legal services 
would be provided so that welfare recipients may far more readily be 
transformed into viable, productive members of our society."1s This 
spectrum is to be achieved, however, without any substantive change 
in the existing law and eligibility requirements. Thus, for example, 
clients will still be required to bring criminal support actions against 
their relatives in order to be eligible for a grant.14 In many other ways 
the recipients' actions or spending patterns will, inevitably, be con-
trolled by and conditioned on their "cooperation" with the department. 
"Special need" will still have to be determined by a social worker, 
albeit a member of the state bureaucracy instead of a member of the 
city bureaucracy.15 The judgment as to the amount required to "bring 
up a child properly in the client's home"16 will still have to be de-
cided in accordance with an inflexible, predetermined catalogue of 
"budgetary standards." Nor have any changes been made in the ap-
peals procedures, where, for example, a provision for the reporting 
of appeal decisions would subject the decision-makers to the constraints 
induced by the opportunity for public scrutiny (and would make ap-
peal decisions available to readers of this SURVEY I). 
Whether any long-term breakthrough in welfare will be achieved 
will depend very much on the enterprise and sensitivity of the new 
state commissioner and his staff. No streamlining or reorganization 




11 Id. §6. 
12 See Cronin, Impact of Federal Welfare Grants on Municipal Government. 40 
B.U.L. Rev. 531. 534 (1960). 
13 Boston Globe. March 13. 1967 at 10. col. 2. 
14 See Acts of 1967. c. 648, §30(3). 
15Id. §§79, 80, provide that all welfare workers currently working for towns and 
cities would be retained as employees in the new state-administered system. 
16Id. §§28(2). 16(1). 59(4). 
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limitations of a welfare system which requires procedures other than 
a gUarantee; to individuals and families, of a basic minimum income, 
subject only to the kind of sampling 'verification that is employed 'by 
goveimnent in regulating the financial affairs of the more' affluent. 
§5.9. Anti-discrimination. legislation'. 'The mere passing of. three 
acts relating to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
is in itself persuasive evidence that 'anti"discrimination laws have been 
accepted in this state. Whether the rea~q for the acceptance lies in'a 
change lrfattitudes, or lies in the fact that the law's enforcement has 
constituted no threat to landlords and employers, isd~patable.<:>ne 
of these acts1 eliminates the former waiting perio'dduringwhich time 
no injunction could be issued restraining an ,employer or a 'property-
owner who is before the Commis~ion.~ The bill submitted to the 
legislature by the Governors sought to: reduce the waiting period froIn 
seventy-two to twenty-four hours; but an amendment in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee eliminated the waiting period entirely. 
" Without opposition from real estate interest groups, the legislature 
passed an act to penalize a real estate Droker against'whom a finding 
of discrimination has been made by 'the Commission: at a public hear-
ing.4 Whereas, fOrnIerly, the Commission had power to refer the name 
of such a broker to the Massachusetts Licensing Board for disciplinary 
actiort/I no such action had ever been taken. Under the new amend-
ment, a broker would have his license suspended for thirty days after 
the first finding against him, and for ninety days following tl1esecond 
finding within two years. . 
Another new act allows a review-procedure to a complainant against 
whom a ruling of no probable cause had been made by the State Com-
missioner, following an investigation of the complainant's allegation;6 
The complainant, within ten days of notice of no probable cause of dis-
crimination made by a member of the Comniission:, may file a request 
for a "preliminary hearing" before the full Commissioh. 'The Commis-
sion may, in its discFetion, allow such a request. FOrnIerly, the com-
plainant had no recourse £tom such a ruling while the respondent, in 
the event of a finding of probable cause being made against him, could 
refuse to conciliate the matter and then contest the finding ata public 
hearing of the full Commission. Under the new amendment, ,the, com-
plainant may seek before the full Commission a 'review of the lack of 
probable cause finding in a "preliminary hearing." This review, how-
ever, will not be in a public hearing. Thus a discrepancy remains 
between the review procedures open to respondents and those open 
to complainants. 
§5.10. Housing. The majority of legislative items recommended 
§5.9. 1 Acts of 1967, c. 525. 
2 Id., c. 570. 
3 House No. 4040 (1967) . 
• Acts of 19/j7, C. 148; 
5 Acts 'of 1961,.c.128. 
6 Acts of '1967, c. 483. 
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by the Special Commission on Low-income Housingl was. passed in 
1966. In 1967, four more of its proposals were enacted. Under the 
Veterans' Housing Program,~ the Commonwealth of.. Massachusetts 
pays an annual maximum subsidy of two and one-half percent of the 
total development costs of veterans' housing for a period of forty years. 
The 1967 Veterans' Housing Act3 raises this subsidy to four percent, 
which, according to the Special Co~mission, "would permit an average 
rent decrease of approximately $10-$14 per month, which in turn 
means that apartments can be made available to families with an aver-
age .income $600.$900 below the present average."4 
. Another act5 increases the Commonwealth's contribution to the 
Housing for the Elderly Program, and removes restrictions, which 
provided for a one-hundred unit maximum and a one-eighth-mile 
separation between projects.6 
Various attempts have been made to facilitate tracing the true owner 
of code~delinquent property. In 1966 an act was passed allowing com· 
plaints to be filed against the city or town clerk when the owner 
could not be located.7 This year, an act was passed that requires the 
conspicuous posting of the name, address and telephone number of 
the owner or agent of premises in every multi-unit dwelling,S and the 
disclosure to the city or town clerk of the true name and address of 
purchasers of real estate.9 
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
§5.11. Neighborhood law offices. A most significant development 
is the opening of neighborhood law offices, financed by the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, in eleven communities: Boston, Cambridge, 
Chelsea-Revere, Lynn, Lowell, Springfield, Worcester, Fitchburg, New 
Bedford, Barnstable County, and Brockton. Most of the legal services 
programs are organized as non-profit corporations. A majority of each 
board of directors are lawyers, and at least one third of the board is 
comprised of laymen who represent the low-income community served 
by the office. For convenience to clients, many of the offices are open 
evenings and weekends. Fundamental to each program is a commit· 
ment to projects of community education about the law in order to 
help people anticipate legal problems and thereby prevent legal crises. 
Each office has standards of financial eligibility for applicants; those 
ineligible for free service are referred to private attorneys through bar 
association referral plans. 
§5.1O. 1 House No. 4040 (1965). 
2 C.L., c. 121, §§26NN-26PP. 
3 Acts of 1967, c. 635. 
4 House No. 4040, at 22 (1965). 
5 Acts of 1967, c. 572. 
6 C.L., c. 121, §§26SS-26VV. 
7 Acts of 1966, c. 707, §8. 
S Acts of 1967, c. 260. 
9 Id., c. 611. 
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The neighborhood offices usually handle only civil legal matters; 
the statewide Massachusetts Defenders Committee is responsible for 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. Most neighborhood offices 
are committed to law reform as well as mere legal service. Suits have 
been filed, for example, to challenge arbitrary cutoffs from public wel-
fare without notice and hearing, to attack evictions from public hous-
ing without announced reason, to prevent arbitrary suspensions from 
school, and to thwart finance companies which abuse the legal process 
by trying to swear out criminal, instead of civil, complaints against 
defaulting debtors who must hold on to mortgaged furniture because 
of competing liens against the furniture. Other activities include 
counsel to community groups which seek zoning changes to protect 
their neighborhoods against industrial takeover, or which desire to 
form credit unions and consumer cooperatives, or which hope to form 
public housing tenant unions or unions of welfare recipients. Neigh-
borhood law offices, therefore, are important to the strategy for devel-
oping new community institutions in the cities. 
10
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